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TALES OF DREAD 
MARK WINDSOR
‘Tales of dread’ is a genre that has received scant attention in aesthetics. In this paper, I aim
to elaborate an account of tales of dread which (1) effectively distinguishes these from
horror stories, and (2) helps explain the close affinity between the two, accommodating
borderline cases. I briefly consider two existing accounts of the genre – namely, those of
Noël Carroll and of Cynthia Freeland – and show why they are inadequate for my purposes.
I then develop my own account of tales of dread, drawing on two theoretical resources:
Freud’s ‘The “Uncanny”’, and Tzvetan Todorov’s The Fantastic. In particular, I draw on Freud
to help distinguish tales of dread from horror stories, and I draw on Todorov to help explain
the fluidity between the genres. I argue that both horror stories and tales of dread feature
apparent impossibilities which are threatening; but whereas in horror stories the existence
of the monster (the apparent impossibility) is confirmed, tales of dread are sustained by 
the audience’s uncertainty pertaining to preternatural objects or events. Where horror
monsters pose an immediate, concrete danger to the subject’s physical well-being, these
preternatural objects or events pose a psychological threat to the subject’s grasp of reality.
I
In his book The Philosophy of Horror, Noël Carroll identifies a narrative genre that
he calls ‘tales of dread’. Unlike horror stories, Carroll claims, tales of dread do not
feature monstrous entities or beings, but rather a distinctive kind of preternatural
event. These events are designed to evoke in audiences an emotion which Carroll
calls ‘art-dread’:
The uncanny event which tops off such stories causes a sense of unease and awe,
perhaps of momentary anxiety and foreboding. These events are constructed to move
the audience rhetorically to the point that one entertains the idea that unavowed,
unknown, and perhaps concealed and inexplicable forces rule the universe.1
Tales of dread have been prevalent since the late Romantic period. Examples 
of the genre include short stories by Edgar Allan Poe (‘The Fall of the House of
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the European Society for Aesthetics
annual conference, Maribor, Slovenia, June 2018. I thank the members of the audience
for their valuable questions and comments. Special thanks go to Shelby Moser and
the Estetika editors for helpful input on earlier drafts. 
1 Noël Carroll, The Philosophy of Horror, or, Paradoxes of the Heart (New York: Routledge,
1990), 42.
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Usher’), Charlotte Perkins Gilman (‘The Yellow Wallpaper’), Guy de Maupassant
(‘Le Horla’), Robert Louis Stevenson (‘The Body Snatcher’), and Algernon
Blackwood (‘The Willows’). Tales of dread can also be found in contemporary
works of literature, including novels by José Saramago (The Double) and Mark
Z. Danielewski (House of Leaves); and films by David Lynch (Lost Highway), David
Cronenberg (Videodrome), and Duncan Jones (Moon). Moreover, recent episodes
of the television series Twin Peaks and Black Mirror show the continuing appeal
of the genre, and how these stories have adapted to encompass new uncanny
technological possibilities, such as artificial intelligence and virtual reality.
Given the enduring popularity of tales of dread, it is unfortunate that the genre
has received scant attention in aesthetics. In this paper, I aim to elaborate an
account of tales of dread which (1) effectively distinguishes these from horror
stories, and (2) helps explain the close affinity between the two genres,
accommodating borderline cases.
Notwithstanding certain challenges that it faces, in what follows I shall assume
that Carroll’s account of horror is broadly correct.2 Carroll defines monsters as
‘beings not believed to exist now according to contemporary science’.3 Monsters
are presented in horror stories as both threatening and impure. This combination
of features is intended to elicit in audiences a peculiar blend of fear and disgust,
which emotion Carroll calls ‘art-horror’. I argue that both horror stories and tales
of dread feature apparent impossibilities which are threatening; but whereas in
horror stories the existence of the monster (the apparent impossibility) is
confirmed, ‘art-dread’ – the emotion that tales of dread specialize in evoking – 
is sustained by the audience’s uncertainty pertaining to preternatural objects or
events. Borderline cases are those that are designed to centrally evoke both art-
dread and art-horror. This can be achieved either by withholding confirmation of
the monster’s existence until late in the narrative, or by maintaining a sufficient
degree of ambiguity as to the monster’s existence. 
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2 Of primary concern here is the charge that Carroll’s definition of horror is not
extensionally adequate: specifically, that it cannot accommodate cases in which 
the ‘monster’, such as the psychopathic killer Norman Bates in Alfred Hitchcock’s Psycho,
appears to be of a kind that is believed to exist now according to contemporary science.
It may be necessary to acknowledge that some narratives which we typically think of
as works of horror lie outside the genre which Carroll’s definition circumscribes. Though
I agree with Carroll when he comments that even if his theory is not ‘invulnerably
comprehensive, it does offer at least a clear picture of the central or core cases of art-
horror’, especially when one considers that ‘slasher’ films and the like are a fairly recent
development of the genre (ibid., 38). To be clear, then, when I speak of works of horror
in this paper, I mean narratives which centrally feature a monster the existence of which
is not countenanced by contemporary science. Such monsters come in both
supernatural and sci-fi variants. 
3 Ibid., 27.
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In the next section I consider two existing accounts of tales of dread – namely,
those of Noël Carroll and Cynthia Freeland – and show why they are inadequate
for my purposes. I then develop my own account of the genre. In the third section
I draw on Freud’s account of the uncanny to help pinpoint what is distinctive of
these stories by specifying the object of art-dread. I argue that ‘tales of dread’ is
another name for uncanny stories, and that ‘art-dread’ is another name for 
the feeling of the uncanny evoked in narrative fiction. I aim to clear up some
misunderstandings about Freud’s work on the uncanny, especially in terms of
how it relates to horror, and propose some important revisions to Freud’s theory.
In the fourth section I draw on Todorov’s account of the fantastic to help
schematize the distinction between horror stories and tales of dread – specifically,
using Todorov’s distinction between the genres of ‘the fantastic’ and ‘the fantastic-
marvellous’ – and explain how individual works can cross that boundary to
varying degrees. I also address some terminological ambiguities concerning 
the use of the word ‘uncanny’ in Todorov’s work. Finally, by way of conclusion,
I offer some brief remarks about the value and appeal of tales of dread, and
suggest a reason why I think these works tend to be more valuable and interesting
than horror stories. 
II
Carroll only briefly mentions tales of dread in The Philosophy of Horror; he
comments that ‘art-dread probably deserves a theory of its own’, though he does
not have one ‘ready to hand’.4 Carroll first introduces the distinction by observing
that there are stories, such as Stevenson’s ‘The Body Snatcher’, which are often
classified as horror but do not feature a monster. Although Carroll acknowledges
that these share a close affinity with horror stories, he does not think that they
evoke the same kind of emotion in the audience. In contrast to horror stories,
tales of dread do not feature disgust as a central element; and although tales of
dread sometimes feature monstrous beings, Carroll comments that ‘in the main
their energy is spent constructing a psychologically disturbing event of
preternatural origins’.5
Since Carroll offered these brief remarks in The Philosophy of Horror, two
attempts have been made to elaborate an account of the genre. I will briefly
outline both these accounts and the key reasons why I think neither is adequate
for my purposes. 
First, in a chapter titled ‘Horror and Art-Dread’, Cynthia Freeland sets out to
describe tales of dread, but without accepting that there is a clear distinction
4 Ibid., 42. 
5 Ibid. 
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between these and horror stories. For Freeland, tales of dread are rather a subset
of horror – one in which the ‘horror is subtle and lingering, a matter of mood more
than monsters’.6 Freeland is right to emphasize the closeness of tales of dread and
horror stories. But while the two genres certainly have much in common, and
while there are doubtless borderline cases, such as those that Freeland discusses,
I nonetheless maintain that there is a useful distinction to be drawn between
them. 
Unlike Carroll, Freeland is not interested in providing a definition of horror. 
In the introduction to her book on horror, The Naked and the Undead, Freeland
expresses scepticism about whether any one definition could capture 
the diversity of the works that go by the name. As she puts it, the genre ‘is just
slippery: It blends at the edges with many other genres such as science fiction
and the thriller’.7 Surely it is true that horror ‘blends at the edges’ with other genres
– not least with tales of dread. But while the boundary between the genres may
be fuzzy, it may still be possible to arrive at a definition by identifying a set of
paradigm cases. The basis for the distinction between horror stories and tales of
dread is the intuition that tales of dread aim to arouse a different kind of emotion
in the audience. This also provides an important motivation for the theoretical
project. If it is true that these stories aim to arouse a different kind of emotional
response in the audience, this is not merely of theoretical interest; it also carries
important consequences for the critical evaluation of individual works.8 For what
makes for a good tale of dread is not the same as what makes for a good horror
story.
I suggest that all of the examples that Freeland discusses in her chapter ‘Horror
and Art-Dread’ are borderline cases that blend central elements of horror stories
and tales of dread. This limited set of examples gives the false impression that
there is no categorical distinction to be drawn between the two genres. That there
is such a distinction is highlighted by stories which exemplify tales of dread but
cannot easily be categorized as horror stories; for example, Poe’s ‘The Fall 
of the House of Usher’ or Lynch’s Lost Highway. 
Even if one concedes Freeland’s position that tales of dread are instances of
a broader category of horror – that is, by delineating horror stories in a sufficiently
broad way – there is still an interesting and, on Freeland’s account, unanswered
question about what distinguishes tales of dread as a subgenre of horror. In other
Tales of Dread
6 Cynthia Freeland, ‘Horror and Art-Dread’, in The Horror Film, ed. Stephen Prince (New
Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2004), 189.
7 Cynthia A. Freeland, The Naked and the Undead: Evil and the Appeal of Horror (Boulder,
CO: Westview, 2000), 10.
8 On the evaluative implications of genre classification, see Catharine Abell, ‘Genre,
Interpretation and Evaluation’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 115 (2015): 25–40.
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words, the question still remains, what is this peculiar emotional effect that tales
of dread specialize in evoking?
Second, Carroll has elaborated an account of tales of dread that occur in 
the television series The Twilight Zone. In this text, Carroll narrows his notion of
the genre by making it a necessary condition that a character is punished for
some wrongdoing in an ironic or ‘mordantly humorous way’, such that ‘audiences
entertain […] that the universe is governed by an all knowing and controlling
intelligence that metes out justice with diabolical wit’.9 In contrast to Freeland’s,
this latter account of Carroll’s runs the risk of being too exclusive. Stated in full,
Carroll defines a tale of dread as: ‘(1) a narrative fantasy; (2) about an event in
which a character is punished; (3) in a manner that is appropriate (the punishment
fits the crime); and (4) mordantly humorous (for example, often ironic).’10 He calls
these stories ‘Tales of Dread because they mandate that audiences entertain
paranoid or anxious imaginings’, specifically that the universe is governed by
some all-knowing intelligence.11 However, not all tales of dread – including many
which I take to be paradigmatic of the genre, such as Perkins Gilman’s ‘The Yellow
Wallpaper’ – imply a moralistic universe that metes out diabolical punishments.
Carroll’s stipulation may be adequate to tales of dread in The Twilight Zone, 
but not to instances of the genre as a whole. Carroll was right to observe in 
The Philosophy of Horror that these stories ‘often correlate with some sense of
cosmic moral justice. But they need not.’12
Nor do I subscribe to Carroll’s distinction between monstrous entities and
preternatural events. As Freeland points out, horror monsters ‘will not be
effectively horrific or threatening unless they do things’.13 More importantly,
though, for my purposes, the emotion that Carroll calls ‘art-dread’ can focus on
preternatural objects or entities as well as events. A case in point is the recurrent
narrative motif of the double or doppelganger – an object of dread par excellence.
Consider the narrator’s description of his uncanny double in Poe’s ‘William Wilson’:
I looked; – and a numbness, an iciness of feeling instantly pervaded my frame. […]
I lowered the lamp in still nearer proximity to the face. Were these – these the lineaments
of William Wilson? I saw, indeed, that they were his, but I shook as if with a fit of the ague,
in fancying they were not.14
9 Noël Carroll, ‘Tales of Dread in The Twilight Zone: A Contribution to Narratology’, 
in Minerva’s Night Out: Philosophy, Pop Culture, and Moving Pictures (Malden, MA: Wiley-
Blackwell, 2013), 223.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid. 
12 Carroll, Philosophy of Horror, 42.
13 Freeland, ‘Horror and Art-Dread’, 196.
14 Edgar Allan Poe, ‘William Wilson’, in Selected Tales (London: Penguin, 1994), 106–7.
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Just like the preternatural events of tales of dread which Carroll describes, 
the appearance of one’s doppelganger can lead one to entertain the idea that
mysterious, inexplicable forces rule the universe. While a doppelganger could, in
the right kind of narrative context, count as a horror monster on Carroll’s
definition, most doppelganger stories sit more readily alongside tales of dread:
the emotion that doppelganger stories typically aim to evoke is art-dread, not
art-horror. Clearly, though, it is more intuitive to think of one’s doppelganger as
a preternatural entity or being rather than an event. 
III
The underlying assumption here is that, like horror stories, tales of dread 
are defined by the emotion which it is their central purpose to evoke in
audiences. So what exactly is this emotion that Carroll and Freeland call ‘art-
dread’?
Let us consider Freeland’s characterization of art-dread as a starting point.
According to Freeland, art-dread is just the name for dread ‘evoked by or in
response to an artwork’.15 Freeland characterizes dread as ‘an ongoing fear of
imminent threat from something deeply unnerving and evil, yet not well-defined
or well-understood’.16 She offers the following example of an object of dread: the
threat of anthrax being transmitted through the mail. Like fear, Freeland claims,
dread involves a sense of danger, but is different in that it is ‘looser and less
focused on a particular object’.17 In contrast to anxiety, dread involves an
anticipated encounter with something ‘profound’, something ‘powerful, grave,
and inexorable’.18
This characterization of Freeland’s may be true enough of the emotion of
dread – in general. But as a characterization of art-dread it misses something
crucial about the kind of stories we are interested in. And that is not just
because not all objects of dread occur in the context of art. Not all fictional
objects of dread are objects of art-dread, either. In short, art-dread is not
a common-or-garden variety of emotion. All things being equal, a story about
a terrorist threat which played on people’s anxieties about anthrax being
transmitted through the mail would not count as a tale of dread. That this
should be so is highlighted by the recent cinematic examples of art-dread
which Freeland identifies: The Sixth Sense, The Blair Witch Project, The Others,
and Signs. Surely it is not incidental that all of these stories involve a dread of
Tales of Dread
15 Freeland, ‘Horror and Art-Dread’, 193.
16 Ibid., 191.
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid., 192.
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something supernatural. What we need is to pinpoint this relationship
between art-dread and the supernatural. 
Now, I suggest that another – and perhaps better, in the sense that it is more
descriptive – name for the emotion of ‘art-dread’ is the ‘uncanny feeling’. 
The uncanny describes the effect of certain phenomena, found both in art and
in life, that are characteristically eerie, creepy, and weird. As Freud put it in the
opening of his now famous essay on the topic, the uncanny is ‘undoubtedly
related to what is frightening – to what arouses dread and horror’.19 Now, Freud’s
theory of the uncanny, which is often referred to in the literature under 
the heading of ‘the return of the repressed’, has oftentimes been co-opted as
a theory of horror. For example, the film scholar Robin Wood extends Freud’s
theory to a general understanding of horror films, claiming that ‘the true subject
of the horror genre is the struggle for recognition of all that our civilization
represses or oppresses’.20 Carroll thinks that it is ‘fair to surmise’ that horror
monsters fall within the class of phenomena that Freud identifies as ‘uncanny’,
‘along with a lot of other stuff’.21
Contrary to this common theoretical understanding, what I want to show
presently is that Freud’s essay on the uncanny actually offers the resources for
distinguishing narratives which aim to evoke art-dread (the ‘uncanny feeling’)
from those which aim to evoke art-horror. ‘Tales of dread’, I suggest, is just another
name for stories the central purpose of which is to evoke this feeling of 
the uncanny.22 In order to do this, it is first necessary to distinguish between 
two different explanations that Freud offers for why we experience certain
phenomena as uncanny – the ‘return of the repressed’, and another explanation,
more often overlooked, that Freud offers, which has to do with the apparent
confirmation of ‘surmounted primitive beliefs’.
According to Freud’s theory of the return of the repressed, the uncanny is 
the feeling that arises when something repressed – namely, some infantile sexual
19 Sigmund Freud, ‘The “Uncanny”’, in The Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud,
vol. 17, An Infantile Neurosis and Other Works, ed. and trans. James Strachey (London:
Vintage, 2001), 219.
20 Robin Wood, Hollywood from Vietnam to Reagan … and Beyond (New York: Columbia
University Press, 2003), 68. In applying this theory of Freud’s to horror film, Wood
acknowledges that he goes beyond the strict Freudian understanding of repression,
which I discuss below, to a broader understanding of the term which encompasses
social norms. 
21 Carroll, Philosophy of Horror, 174.
22 To be clear, I do not mean to imply that classification of a work is contingent on any
given audience member’s emotional response. The purpose of a story to evoke an
emotional response can be identified by reference to the author’s (or the hypothetical
author’s) intention, independently of whether the work does in fact manifest such
a feeling in the audience. 
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complex – is revived in the subconscious by some impression. For example, 
in his well-known reading of E. T. A. Hoffmann’s ‘The Sandman’, Freud locates 
the uncanny effect of the story in the threat posed to the protagonist Nathanael’s
eyes by the fabled Sandman and his dubious human avatars, Coppelius and
Coppola. In the context of the narrative, Freud claims that this threat to
Nathanael’s eyes functions as a substitute for Nathanael’s (and presumably also
the reader’s) repressed Oedipal dread of castration. 
Until quite late in the essay, Freud maintains that all uncanny phenomena can
be explained in terms of repressed infantile complexes. In the opening of the third
and final section, Freud clearly states that ‘the uncanny […] is something which
is secretly familiar […] which has undergone repression and then returned from
it’, and that ‘everything that is uncanny fulfils this condition’.23 However, just a few
pages on, Freud goes on to distinguish another explanation for why we
experience certain phenomena as uncanny. This has to do with the apparent
confirmation of ‘surmounted primitive beliefs’. 
According to the latter theory, we all inherit, both from our individual and
collective past, certain ‘primitive’ beliefs in animistic and magical phenomena –
such as belief in the existence of spirits and in the ‘omnipotence of thoughts’ –
which most us have largely, but not totally, ‘surmounted’. ‘As soon as something
actually happens in our lives,’ Freud writes, ‘which seems to confirm the old,
discarded beliefs we get a feeling of the uncanny.’24 Say, for example, that as
a child I believed in the power of telepathy, but now later in life I have
‘surmounted’ this belief. If something actually happens in my life that appears to
confirm my previously held belief in telepathic powers – say that a friend rings
me up because she ‘knew’ I was feeling upset about something – Freud’s theory
predicts that I will experience the event as uncanny. 
I have argued elsewhere that compared to the return of the repressed,
Freud’s theory of surmounted primitive beliefs faces fewer serious objections
and carries greater explanatory power in respect of the uncanny.25 Perhaps 
the biggest problem with Freud’s return of the repressed is that it fails to
explain anything that is distinctive about uncanny phenomena. This becomes
clear when one considers that Freud uses broadly the same theory to account
for a whole range of psychological phenomena, including dreams, jokes, errors
(or ‘parapraxes’), and neurotic symptoms. In contrast, Freud’s theory of
surmounted primitive beliefs provides a fairly rich, and persuasive, explanation
Tales of Dread
23 Freud, ‘The “Uncanny”’, 245.
24 Ibid., 246–47.
25 Mark Windsor, ‘Freud on the Uncanny: A Tale of Two Theories’, Philosophy and Literature
(forthcoming).
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for why we experience certain phenomena as uncanny: because they create
the dubious appearance of the supernatural in the context of one’s experience
of reality. 
Carroll may be right that horror monsters qualify as candidates for uncanny
experiences according to Freud’s return of the repressed. Indeed, presumably
almost anything can qualify as a candidate for an uncanny experience according
to this theory. That is because, according to the Freudian model, repression
necessarily involves unconscious processes of ‘dream-work’ which transform 
the latent, unconscious content of an infantile complex into its manifest,
conscious content. For example, the threat posed to Nathanael’s eyes in 
‘The Sandman’ is purportedly the displacement of Nathanael’s latent Oedipal
fear of castration. In order to unearth this latent content, Freud referred to 
the psychoanalytic study of dreams, myths, and fantasies, which supposedly
relevels a common symbolic link between the eyes and the male genitals. But
consider the plethora of common symbols for the male genitals, which
psychoanalysis claims to have discovered. These include pens, fountains,
umbrellas, trees, balloons, and a virtual menagerie of animals.26 Presumably, all
of these things would qualify as likely candidates to elicit uncanny feelings by
reviving in the mind repressed Oedipal fears and desires. Thus, it turns out that
Freud’s return of the repressed theory of the uncanny is no more apposite to
horror monsters than it is to trees and umbrellas. 
Things are different when it comes to Freud’s theory of surmounted
primitive beliefs. There are two key features of the theory which are important
for us here. First, the object or event that appears to confirm the surmounted
primitive belief must be experienced as taking place in reality. As Freud writes,
the ‘whole thing is purely an affair of “reality-testing”, a question of the material
reality of the phenomena’.27 Conversely, in cases which involve the return of
repressed infantile complexes, ‘the question of material reality does not arise’.28
Second, this incongruous object or event must cause uncertainty about what
is real. As Freud puts it, this class of uncanny things cannot arise unless there
is ‘a conflict of judgement as to whether things which have been “surmounted”
and are regarded as incredible may not, after all, be possible’.29
At the same time that it captures what is distinctive about the object of
uncanny feelings, this theory of Freud’s provides the means of distinguishing
26 Sigmund Freud, Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, ed. and trans. James Strachey
(London: Penguin, 1973), 188–89.
27 Freud, ‘The “Uncanny”’, 248.
28 Ibid., 249. 
29 Ibid., 250.
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the object of art-dread from the object of art-horror.30 Nevertheless, I do not want
to adopt Freud’s theory of surmounted primitive beliefs wholesale, for there are
significant problems with the theory as it stands. Freud’s genetic account of
infantile and ‘primitive’ beliefs is a lot to take on board. It is far from clear that
Freud’s views about infantile and ‘primitive’ beliefs are well founded; nor does
Freud furnish any clear model for understanding either how these beliefs may be
passed down from earlier stages of development to later ones, or what exactly is
involved in ‘surmounting’ such beliefs. Perhaps most importantly, though, it does
not seem tenable that in order to experience some apparent magical or animistic
phenomenon as uncanny, one must have previously held, and later ‘surmounted’,
a belief in its existence. If I had never believed in telepathic powers, does that
mean I cannot experience an apparent act of telepathy as uncanny?31 
I suggest, however, that these problems can be overcome if we reframe Freud’s
sense of the uncanny as the dubious appearance of the supernatural in the
context of one’s experience of reality, but without the dubious and burdensome
genetic postulates pertaining to infantile and ‘primitive’ beliefs. Specifically,
I suggest that we reframe this dubious appearance of the supernatural in terms
of an apparent impossibility. As such, we can circumscribe the kinds of
phenomena that we are interested in without any reference to infantile or
‘primitive’ belief systems. Moreover, on this revised account, whether or not I or
my ‘primitive’ ancestors used to believe in, say, telepathy, an apparent act of mind
reading is still apt to have an uncanny effect – if I believe that telepathy is
impossible. Thus, I propose that the object of uncanny feelings is something that
appears to be really happening, which appears to be impossible, which causes
uncertainty about what is real, and in virtue of which uncertainty is evaluated 
Tales of Dread
30 Steven Jay Schneider is one of the few authors to champion Freud’s theory of
surmounted primitive beliefs. But contrary to my approach, Schneider applies Freud’s
theory to horror films. Specifically, Schneider claims that horror monsters can be
understood as ‘metaphorical embodiments’ of surmounted primitive beliefs. Whatever
the merits of Schneider’s approach, it is important to recognize that horror monsters
fail to satisfy Freud’s condition that an uncanny phenomenon must bring about
a conflict of judgement about what is real in the story. Hence Schneider’s claim that
horror monsters can be understood as metaphorical (rather than literal) embodiments
of surmounted primitive beliefs. See Steven Jay Schneider, ‘Monsters as (Uncanny)
Metaphors: Freud, Lakoff, and the Representation of Monstrosity in Cinematic Horror,’
in Horror Film Reader, ed. Alain Silver and James Ursini (New York: Limelight, 2000), 
167–91. For critical discussion, see Noël Carroll, ‘Psychoanalysis and the Horror Film’, in
Minerva’s Night Out, 145–57.
31 For more on the problems pertaining to Freud’s theory of surmounted primitive beliefs,
see Windsor, ‘Freud on the Uncanny’, and Cynthia Freeland, ‘Explaining the Uncanny in
The Double Life of Véronique’, in Horror Film and Psychoanalysis: Freud’s Worst Nightmare,
ed. Steven Jay Schneider (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 87–105.
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as a threat.32 Thereby we can identify the peculiar kind of threat evoked by 
the uncanny object: a psychological threat to one’s grasp of reality. 
Let me offer an example to illustrate. Near the beginning of David Lynch’s
film Lost Highway, one of the two leading male characters, Fred Madison, is
approached at a party by a pale, sinister-looking man. This ‘Mystery Man’ tells Fred
that they have met before. Fred does not recognize the man and asks him where
he thinks they met. The Mystery Man replies: ‘At your house. Don’t you remember?
[…] In fact, I’m there right now.’33 At first Fred is incredulous. Then the Mystery
Man produces a mobile phone and suggests that Fred ring his house, which he
does, hesitantly. Apparently, the same Mystery Man answers on the other end. 
Fred responds mirthfully to the event ‘as if it’s a party trick of some kind’, but after
a few moments he ‘suddenly turns serious’.34 Angrily, Fred demands to know who
the Mystery Man is and how he got into his house. ‘The man laughs – identical
laughs – both over the phone and in person.’35 The voice of the Mystery Man on the
phone demands: ‘Give me my phone back.’36
Notice how Fred’s emotional response to the Mystery Man’s apparent
bilocation changes. At first he responds light-heartedly as if it were a ‘party trick
of some kind’, but then, once his attempts to rationalize the encounter fail, 
he ‘suddenly turns serious’. This marks the point at which Fred’s uncertainty about
what is happening causes him to evaluate the apparent impossibility as a threat,
the point at which the apparent impossibility becomes, for Fred, an object of 
the uncanny.
Some caveats must be offered here when applying the theory to works of
fiction. First, if the preternatural object or event is going to have an uncanny effect
on the audience, it must appear to be impossible in the context of the fictional
world of the work, and not merely appear to be impossible relative to the
audience’s beliefs about the actual world.37 Many things can be found in fiction
which would be impossible in the actual world but are perfectly commonplace
in their respective fictional worlds. Witches, wizards, spirits, magic potions, and
the like are part and parcel of fairy tales and other kinds of fantasy fiction. As Freud
32 Elsewhere I have elaborated a definition of the uncanny as an anxious uncertainty about
what is real caused by an apparent impossibility. Mark Windsor, ‘What Is the Uncanny?’,
British Journal of Aesthetics 59 (2019): 54–65.
33 David Lynch and Brian Gifford, Lost Highway (London: Faber and Faber, 1997), 25.
34 Ibid., 26.
35 Ibid., 27.
36 Ibid.
37 Here I adopt the view that audiences are guided by what Stacie Friend calls the Reality
Assumption: ‘the assumption that everything that is (really) true is fictionally the case,
unless excluded by the work.’ Stacie Friend, ‘The Real Foundation of Fictional Worlds’,
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (2017): 29–42.
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observes, in these cases we ‘adapt our judgement to the imaginary reality
imposed on us by the writer, and regard souls, spirits and ghosts as though their
existence had the same validity as our own has in material reality’.38 Part of what
makes the scene from Lost Highway described above so memorable and affecting
is that it marks the first time in the film that the audience is presented with
something that clearly appears to contradict the natural laws that are assumed
to govern the fictional world of the work.39 What makes the film a tale of dread
and not merely a work of fiction which features an uncanny event is the extent
to which it sustains the audience’s uncertainty about what is real in the fiction. 
The second point concerns the nature of the audience’s emotional response
to something which is known to be fictional. Unlike Fred, of course, we know 
that the Mystery Man and his uncanny double do not exist. How then can 
the Mystery Man and his double pose a psychological threat to our grasp of reality
when we know that he is merely fictional? Here we have a particular instance of
a much broader problem in aesthetics concerning the nature of emotional
responses to objects that are known to be fictional – namely, the so-called
‘paradox of fiction’. What must be accounted for here is that the audience’s
emotional response stems from an imaginative engagement with the represented
contents of the work. When I watch Lost Highway, I make-believe that the Mystery
Man and his double are incongruous relative to what I believe is possible in 
the fictional world of the film. The Mystery Man and his uncanny double do not
threaten my grasp of reality. Rather, I make-believe that they do.40 Whether the
emotional response I have in virtue of this imaginative engagement with the work
should be understood as a fully fledged instance of uncanniness or rather some
quasi-form of emotion is a question that I shall here leave open. 
A final point: notice how in this example from Lost Highway it is ambiguous
whether the object of uncanny feelings should best be thought of as an entity or
an event. Carroll’s distinction between monstrous entities and preternatural
events is orthogonal to the real distinction between the objects of art-horror and
art-dread. It is true that tales of dread may be associated with preternatural events
rather than preternatural objects. That is because events tend to be less
epistemically robust than concrete objects: events tend to admit of a greater
variety and nuance of explanation. But we must be careful here not to conflate
the object or target of art-dread with its cause. Contrary to Freeland’s
characterization of the emotion, art-dread may be focused on particular (fictional)
Tales of Dread
38 Freud, ‘The “Uncanny”’, 50.
39 Thanks to Karen Simecek for highlighting this point.
40 I draw here on Kendall Walton’s Mimesis and Make-Believe: On the Foundations of 
the Representational Arts (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990).
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objects, but the cause of the emotion is necessarily something mysterious and
elusive: uncertainty about what is real (in the fiction) caused by an apparent
impossibility.
To sum up, just as art-horror is not any common-or-garden variety of horror,
neither is art-dread any common-or-garden variety of dread. In both cases, it is
the nature of the object that distinguishes the emotions in question. Art-horror
is directed at threatening, impure beings that are not believed to exist now
according to contemporary science. Art-dread is directed at apparent
impossibilities which cause uncertainty about what is real, and are threatening
on account of that very uncertainty. Where horror monsters typically pose an
immediate concrete danger to the subject’s physical well-being, uncanny objects
and events pose a psychological threat to the subject’s grasp of reality: horror
monsters are objects of fear or panic; uncanny phenomena are objects of dread
or anxiety. 
An important discrepancy arises from this distinction between the objects of
art-dread and art-horror. Art-dread is directed at phenomena which appear to
be impossible, cause uncertainty about what is real, and are threatening in virtue
of causing such uncertainty. These uncanny phenomena occur in life as well 
as in art. Art-horror, on the other hand, is directed at phenomena – namely,
monsters – which, by definition, do not exist. Art-dread is another name for 
the uncanny feeling evoked in fictional narratives, whereas art-horror has no real-
life analogue. This discrepancy between the two emotions points us in 
the direction of being able to draw a line between tales of dread and horror
stories. It is to this question that I now turn.
IV
In his classic work of literary theory, The Fantastic, Todorov provides a taxonomy
of narrative genres which centrally feature preternatural events. He calls these
genres ‘the uncanny’, ‘the fantastic’, and ‘the marvellous’. Membership of each
genre depends on the reader’s interpretation of preternatural events; whether,
on the one hand, events are given a natural or psychological interpretation, which
genre he calls ‘the uncanny’, or whether, on the other hand, they are given
a supernatural interpretation, which genre he calls ‘the marvellous’. The genre
of ‘the fantastic’ exists between the uncanny and the marvellous: the fantastic
takes place for the duration of the reader’s hesitation between a natural and 
a supernatural interpretation of narrative events.41
41 Tzvetan Todorov, The Fantastic, trans. Richard Howard (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press, 1975).
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As Todorov points out, pure cases of the fantastic are rare. Most narratives
that engage fantastic hesitation will, at some point before the end of the story,
confirm either a naturalistic or supernatural interpretation of preternatural
events. These narratives then fall into one of two intermediate genres: either 
‘the fantastic-uncanny’ (the supernatural explained), or ‘the fantastic-marvellous’
(the supernatural confirmed). Todorov offers Henry James’s ‘The Turn of the Screw’
as a rare example of the pure fantastic, that is, a story which effectively maintains
fantastic hesitation through to the end.
Tales of dread, I claim, are instances of fantastic, or else of the uncanny
bordering on the fantastic, whereas horror stories are instances of the fantastic-
marvellous.42 To be clear, Todorov’s genre categories are not sufficient to
distinguish horror stories and tales of dread. Todorov’s genres are dependent
solely on the reader’s interpretation of narrative events, whereas horror stories
and tales of dread are both dependent on the kind of emotion that each is
designed to evoke in the audience. Many examples of fantastic narratives –
including one of Todorov’s central examples of the genre, Jacques Cazotte’s 
The Devil in Love – do not aim to evoke the uncanny feeling in the audience.
Nonetheless, Todorov’s account is helpful for understanding the boundary
between horror stories and tales of dread, and how individual works can straddle
that boundary to varying degrees. But before I go any further, I need to address
some apparent terminological inconsistencies. 
Of course, it should be clear that what Todorov calls ‘the fantastic’ does not
coincide with the typical meaning of the word ‘fantasy’ (and its cognates) in
English, which coincides with what Todorov calls ‘the marvellous’. What is more
problematic, though, is the apparent incompatibility here between Todorov’s uses
of ‘uncanny’ and mine. For, on my account, the uncanny feeling is dependent on
just the kind of uncertainty about what is real that Todorov posits as the defining
feature of the fantastic, which uncertainty is precluded by the genre that
Todorov calls ‘the uncanny’. However, what I want to show is that, although
these two uses of ‘uncanny’ are not coextensive – in particular, Todorov’s use
of ‘uncanny’ is much broader than mine –, neither are they incompatible.
To begin with, it is helpful to point out a discrepancy between two different
uses of the word ‘uncanny’ in Todorov’s work in its English translation. First,
Todorov uses ‘uncanny’ to refer to the genre of ‘the uncanny’, using 
the substantive ‘l’étrange’ (literally, ‘the strange’). Second, Todorov describes
Tales of Dread
42 Todorov describes Poe’s ‘The Fall of the House of Usher’, which is one of my central
examples of a tale of dread, as an instance of ‘the uncanny bordering on the fantastic’.
Ibid., 47.
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a certain kind of narrative event as ‘uncanny’ using the adjective ‘étrange’ (literally,
‘strange’).43 Let us examine each of these uses more closely. 
Contrary to what one might expect, uncanny (‘étrange’) events are not, on
Todorov’s account, proprietary to the genre of the uncanny (‘l’étrange’). In fact,
uncanny events are as central to the genre of the fantastic as they are to 
the genre of the uncanny. For Todorov, an ‘uncanny event’ is another name for
‘an apparently supernatural event’.44 Such events are just the kind of events that
bring about ‘fantastic hesitation’, that is, uncanny events are what cause 
the reader to hesitate between natural and supernatural interpretations of
a story. As such, uncanny events are a necessary feature of the genre of 
the fantastic. As Todorov puts it, ‘without “uncanny events”, the fantastic cannot
even appear’.45
Todorov’s usage of ‘uncanny’ to describe uncanny events, then, is closely
aligned with my usage of the term to describe the feeling of the uncanny. 
The uncanny feeling is the emotional response had by characters and 
the audience to uncanny events if the uncertainty about what is real caused by
such events poses a threat to characters’ and the audience’s grasp of what is real
(in the story). But what about Todorov’s usage of the term to describe the genre
of the uncanny? This is what Todorov has to say about the genre in its ‘pure
state’:
In works that belong to this genre, events are related which may be readily accounted
for by the laws of reason, but which are, in one way or another, incredible, extraordinary,
shocking, singular, disturbing or unexpected, and which thereby provoke in the character
and in the reader a reaction similar to that which works of the fantastic have made
familiar.46
What distinguishes the genres of the uncanny and the fantastic is that uncanny
events in the former can be readily accounted for by the laws of reason, whereas
in the latter they do not admit of any ready natural explanation – they cause
uncertainty about the nature of the world represented in the fiction. But notice
that in both cases uncanny events tend to provoke a similar reaction. Conversely,
in the genre of the marvellous, Todorov observes that ‘supernatural elements
provoke no particular reaction either in the characters or in the implicit
43 For a useful discussion of this terminological discrepancy, and support for the alignment
of the Freudian concept of the uncanny with Todorov’s genre of the fantastic, see
Maria M. Tatar, ‘The Houses of Fiction: Towards a Definition of the Uncanny’, Comparative
Literature 33 (1981): 168n2. 
44 Todorov, The Fantastic, 25.
45 Ibid., 92.
46 Ibid., 46.
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reader’.47 As such, there is an important asymmetry regarding the relationship
between the genres of the fantastic and the uncanny on the one hand and the
relationship between the genres of the fantastic and the marvellous on the other. 
How can we explain this asymmetry and, in particular, the closeness of 
the uncanny and the fantastic? Recall that for something to have an uncanny
effect in fiction, the fictional world must be assumed by the audience to be bound
by the same natural laws as the actual world. Likewise, the hesitation that is
constitutive of the fantastic requires that the fictional world is assumed by 
the reader to be bound by the same natural laws as the actual world. Thus,
Todorov defines the fantastic as ‘that hesitation experienced by a person who
knows only the laws of nature, confronting an apparently supernatural event’.48
Conversely, in a marvellous world, an apparently supernatural event will not
merely appear to be supernatural – it will simply be supernatural. It will not cause
the audience any uncertainty about the nature of the fictional world. There is no
such thing as an uncanny event in a marvellous world.
I propose that what Todorov calls uncanny events tend to provoke a similar
reaction in both the genre of the fantastic and of the uncanny because in both
genres uncanny events may bring about fantastic hesitation, but to different
degrees and with different consequences pertaining to the interpretation of the
narrative as a whole. Consider that a preternatural event in real life may be
experienced as uncanny if it appears to be impossible and causes anxious
uncertainty about what is real. For example, a strange coincidence, such as
repeatedly encountering the same number throughout the day, might suggest
something ominous and fateful going on.49 But such a coincidence need not
seriously disrupt one’s higher-order beliefs about how the world works in order
to be experienced as uncanny (even though it might do). Rather, it may just bring
about a momentary, doubtful tension; a flickering feeling of uncertainty. I suggest
that such an uncanny coincidence in life is analogous to an uncanny event as it
occurs in Todorov’s genre of the uncanny. In both cases, the uncanny event can
all along be readily accounted for by laws of reason – it was ‘just a coincidence’.
What distinguishes uncanny events as they occur in Todorov’s genre of 
the fantastic is that they bring about higher-order disruption to one’s beliefs
about the fictional world in question. This, I take it, is what Todorov means when
he writes that the ‘fantastic is defined as a special perception of uncanny events’.50
The difference is in the degree of uncertainty caused by the events in question. 
Tales of Dread
47 Ibid., 54.
48 Ibid., 25.
49 I borrow this example from Freud, ‘The “Uncanny”’, 237–38. 
50 Todorov, The Fantastic, 91.
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There is something right about Todorov placing the uncanny on the naturalistic
side of the fantastic, then. For in the genre of the marvellous, supernatural
elements ‘provoke no particular reaction’: the uncanny cannot take hold. What is
infelicitous about Todorov’s choice of terminology is the implication that 
the genre of the uncanny is incompatible with the feeling of the uncanny, as I,
developing Freud, define it, and the implication that uncanny events are less than
central to the genre of the fantastic. Both these implications turn out to be
unfounded. 
We are now ready to apply Todorov’s schema to help us understand 
the distinction between horror stories and tales of dread. The boundary between
tales of dread and horror stories can be schematized using Todorov’s boundary
between the fantastic and the marvellous. Both tales of dread and horror stories
involve the appearance of the impossible in an otherwise ordinary world; but with
horror stories, the audience eventually comes to accept the existence of 
the apparently impossible being – the monster. At this point the narrative
transitions from the fantastic to the marvellous. As Carroll writes: ‘whereas 
the fantastic is defined by an oscillation between naturalistic and supernatural
explanations, horror requires that at some point attempts at ordinary scientific
explanations be abandoned in favor of a supernatural (or a sci-fi) explanation.’51
Once the existence of the monster is confirmed, the uncertainty about what is
real, which is necessary for art-dread, is precluded. After this transition point, 
the supernatural or sci-fi elements of the narrative may still appear unnatural or,
in Carroll’s terminology, ‘impure’. But the fictional world of the work must be
accepted by the characters and the audience as one that accommodates 
the existence of the monster. Characters may still react to monsters as to
‘extraordinary beings in an ordinary world’, yet both the characters and 
the audience know that the monster exists.52 The monster cannot threaten 
the audience’s grasp of what is real in the story. 
An upshot of this account is that horror stories often evoke art-dread for
a time: specifically, up to the point at which the existence of the monster is
confirmed. This explains how, as Carroll observes, ‘some fictions may traffic in
both art-horror and art-dread’, and how ‘the admixture may take a range of
forms in different stories’.53 From the point at which the audience first glimpses
the incongruous presence of the monster, to the point at which the monster is
fully revealed, the emotions of art-dread and art-horror may blend to varying
degrees. 
51 Carroll, Philosophy of Horror, 145.
52 Noël Carroll, ‘The Nature of Horror’, Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 46 (1987): 52.
53 Carroll, Philosophy of Horror, 42. 
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The point of transition from the fantastic to the marvellous is not cut-and-dry,
nor is the distinction between works of horror and tales of dread. That is
because the uncertainty about what is real, which sustains art-dread, admits of
degrees. Specifically, uncertainty about what is real in a story – prompted by 
the appearance of an uncanny object or event – can vary along two dimensions.
First, the point at which the audience gives up a natural interpretation can vary
along the timeline of the narrative. Second, there are degrees of certainty and
uncertainty about how to interpret a story. Given these variables, we can see both
how the point of transition from art-dread and art-horror will be shaded by
degrees of ambiguity, and how some individual works may not be more readily
categorized as either a horror story or a tale of dread. 
A story need not sustain uncertainty about what is real through to the end
to count as a tale of dread. Tales of dread are not restricted to pure cases of 
the fantastic. For example, Poe’s ‘The Fall of the House of Usher’ takes the reader
right to the cusp of believing that the eponymous house is haunted, only at 
the very end to pull back and affirm a naturalistic explanation of events.
Conversely, M. R. James’s ‘Oh, Whistle, and I’ll Come to You, My Lad’ for the most
part plays on the reader’s uncertainty about apparently supernatural events,
only at the very end to confirm the existence of the ghost. Tales of dread are
stories the primary purpose of which is to elicit the art-dread emotion, just as
horror stories are stories the primary purpose of which is to elicit art-horror.54
Although ‘The Fall of the House of Usher’ is an instance of ‘the fantastic-
uncanny’, and ‘Oh, Whistle and I’ll Come to You, My Lad’ an instance of ‘the
fantastic-marvellous’, both may qualify as tales of dread if it is their primary
purpose to elicit art-dread. Indeed, it may be typical that tales of dread affirm
by the end either a supernatural or natural explanation of preternatural events,
or at least, to weigh down on one side or the other, given that pure cases of 
the fantastic are quite rare.55
Borderline cases are those that centrally evoke both art-dread and art-horror,
or where it is ambiguous whether the primary purpose is to evoke one or 
the other emotion. A good example of a borderline case which sits more or less
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54 For an account of how genre categories are distinguished according to the purposes
that works belonging to them are intended to serve, see Abell, ‘Genre, Interpretation
and Evaluation’.
55 Greg Currie and Jon Jureidini offer a valuable discussion of why uncanny effects are
difficult to sustain in narrative fiction, which also sheds light on why pure instances of
the fantastic are rare. In brief, this is because audiences are too good at second-guessing
author’s intentions. The audience sees early on that the author intends to explain
uncanny events naturalistically or to affirm a supernatural explanation. Greg Currie and
Jon Jureidini, ‘Art and Delusion’, Monist 86 (2003): 556–78. 
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equally across the divide is offered by Freeland in a chapter in The Naked and
the Undead, aptly titled ‘Uncanny Horror’ – Stanley Kubrick’s film The Shining.
Kubrick commented that he was attracted to make a film adaptation of Stephen
King’s novel because the story managed to ‘strike an extraordinary balance
between the psychological and the supernatural’.56 To the extent that the
narrative leaves it uncertain whether or not there really are supernatural forces
at work in the Overlook Hotel, The Shining should be classified as a tale of dread
rather than a horror story. Is Jack a monster proper, or just a man going insane?
V
At the opening, I noted that a successful account of tales of dread would need
both to effectively distinguish these from horror stories and to help explain
the close affinity between the two genres. What distinguishes tales of dread
from horror stories is that each aims to evoke a different kind of emotion in 
the audience. In turn, what defines each of these emotions is an object or event
under a certain kind of description. Developing aspects of Freud’s theory of 
the uncanny, I hope to have provided a coherent and convincing account 
of what is distinctive of the fictional object of art-dread in contrast to that 
of art-horror. Both the objects of art-horror and art-dread involve apparent
impossibilities which are threatening. But whereas in horror stories, 
the existence of the apparent impossibility – the monster – is confirmed during
the narrative, tales of dread are sustained by the audience’s uncertainty regarding
preternatural objects or events. The object of art-dread is something that appears
to be impossible, which causes uncertainty about what is real in the story, and is
threatening because of that very uncertainty.
The account that I have offered avoids the problems that I identified with
Carroll’s and Freeland’s respective accounts of the genre. First, contra Freeland,
my account provides a principled means of distinguishing tales of dread from
horror stories. At the same time it also explains what the objects of art-dread and
art-horror have in common, and thereby provides an explanation for the genres’
perceived continuity. Second, it avoids Carroll’s too narrow requirement that tales
of dread imply a moralistic universe that metes out diabolical punishments. Tales
of dread do characteristically suggest the presence of mysterious, inexplicable
forces in the universe; but these need not be moralistic. Third, contra Carroll’s
distinction, the account allows that art-dread can focus on preternatural objects
as well as events; and contra Freeland’s characterization of the emotion, it allows
that art-dread can focus on very particular fictional objects, such as the face of
56 Quoted in Freeland, The Naked and the Undead, 217.
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a doppelganger. What makes the object of art-dread psychologically disturbing
need not be its lack of concrete particularity, but rather that it appears to be
impossible and causes uncertainty about what is real in the story.  
In contrast to horror monsters, which, by definition, do not exist, uncanny
phenomena can be found in life as well as in art. That is why the boundary
between tales of dread and horror stories coincides with the boundary between
Todorov’s genres of the fantastic and the marvellous. Once a story transitions
from the fantastic to the marvellous – when the audience comes to believe in
the existence of a monster, such as when we come to accept the existence of
the ghost in ‘Oh, Whistle, and I’ll Come to You, My Lad’ – the uncertainty about
what is real that is necessary for art-dread is lost. But a story need not sustain
such uncertainty through to the end to count as an instance of the genre. Tales
of dread are stories the primary purpose of which is to evoke art-dread in 
the audience. Freeland is right to observe that genres blend at the edges:
ambiguity about classification of individual works comes in to the degree that
it is ambiguous whether a work primarily aims to evoke art-dread or art-horror.
Todorov’s account helps us understand how the boundary between art-dread
and art-horror may be shaded by degrees of uncertainty, and hence how there
may be a level of indeterminacy when it comes to categorizing individual
works.
There are surely many interesting and pressing questions about tales of dread
that I have not touched on. Why, given that art-dread is essentially a negative
emotion, do we value and enjoy these tales? One promising solution has to do
with the peculiar kind of cognitive frisson elicited by uncanny phenomena – 
the peculiar and disturbing cognitive tension brought about by something that
both appears to be really happening and appears to be impossible. This tension
is one that demands resolution. Either what appears to be impossible is not really
happening or it is not in fact impossible. The uncanny object is like a puzzle that
refuses to be solved. 
In contrast to horror stories, which often tend to be quite formulaic, tales of
dread often play with or subvert narrative conventions in order to create
uncertainty about the events represented. Other works in the genre introduce
uncertainty at the level of the narrative itself. For example, Mark Z. Danielewski’s
House of Leaves would count as a straightforward horror story, were it not for
the story’s ingenious mode of presentation – comprising found documents,
including an academic study of a supposedly lost documentary film, The Navidson
Record, alongside various first-person commentaries and interviews – which
casts layers of doubt and obscurity over the supernatural events pertaining 
to the titular ‘House’. In this respect, then, House of Leaves is exemplary: tales
Tales of Dread
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of dread tend to be more diverse, unpredictable, and thereby more interesting
than horror stories because in order to sustain art-dread, the audience 
must be successfully kept in the dark about the precise nature of the fictional
object.
Mark Windsor
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